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Abstract 
The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential 
effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on participation, 
and reasonably high on the depth of the parties’ commitments (ambition), its Achilles’ heel will likely be compliance. 
Concerning long-term effectiveness, we argue that Paris does little to restructure states’ incentives so as to avoid free 
riding. At worst, it might end up as a failure, much like Kyoto did. On the other hand, domestic and international norms 
could continue to develop in a direction that makes it more and more difficult for individuals, firms, and states alike to 
ignore the plea to limit and reduce their carbon footprints. Technological progress that gradually reduces abatement 
costs, combined with leadership by major emitters such as the United States, might further strengthen climate 
cooperation and enhance other countries’ willingness to follow through. However, deep political polarization continues 
to represent a significant barrier to U.S. leadership on climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
While the expectations for the 2015 Paris climate 
change meeting were modest, the outcome—the Paris 
Agreement—was widely greeted with enthusiasm (e.g., 
Brun, 2016; Dimitrov, 2016). A bottom-up agreement, 
Paris requires countries to submit nationally deter-
mined contributions (NDCs) to reducing global emis-
sions. It also includes a set of mechanisms for ratchet-
ing up these NDCs over time. Partly because the NDCs 
are not legally binding, Paris does not include any en-
forcement measures. Importantly, therefore, the inten-
tion is that once key countries make first steps towards 
cutting their emissions, others will follow suit.  
In this paper, we assess the short-term and long-
term effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. By short-
term effectiveness we mean the extent to which Paris 
may be expected to contribute to reducing global 
emissions in its first five-year period. By long-term ef-
fectiveness we mean the extent to which it is likely to 
reduce global emissions in a time perspective longer 
than five years.  
Section 2 clarifies the criteria we use to assess the 
Paris Agreement’s effectiveness. Sections 3 and 4 con-
sider the Agreement’s short-term and long-term effec-
tiveness, respectively. We argue that its short-term ef-
fectiveness will likely be limited. Moreover, its long-
term effectiveness remains uncertain. At worst, the 
Agreement might prove to be a failure. At best, it might 
cause a race to the top that eventually makes it very ef-
fective in the long term. The outcome will likely de-
pend on, among other things, whether major emitters 
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prove able and willing to take the lead. In section 5 we 
discuss the prospects for such leadership by one major 
emitter that has a particularly important role as a first 
mover—the United States. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. Criteria for Evaluation 
To be effective, a climate agreement must satisfy three 
requirements (Barrett, 2003). First, it must attract 
broad participation to ensure that most (or preferably 
all) of the world’s anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions are covered by the agreement. Second, to 
make a real difference for curbing climate change the 
agreement must reflect high ambitions, in the sense that 
it must commit the participating countries to deep emis-
sions reductions. Finally, the agreement must achieve 
high compliance rates, that is, the participating countries 
must actually meet their emissions reduction targets. 
We emphasize that these three conditions for ef-
fectiveness apply to all climate agreements, regardless 
of their type. In particular, they apply regardless of 
whether the participating countries’ commitments to 
curbing emissions are determined top down or bottom 
up. They also apply regardless of the extent to which the 
participating countries are held responsible for their ac-
tions internationally or only at the national level. 
Importantly, satisfying one or two requirements is 
not enough. In the words of Simmons (1998, p. 78), 
“while compliance may be necessary for effectiveness, 
there is no reason to consider it sufficient”. The same 
can be said about broad participation and deep com-
mitments: Whereas each condition is necessary, all 
three must be fulfilled to ensure effectiveness. 
Conversely, any climate agreement that fails to sat-
isfy at least one of the requirements will experience 
free riding in one or more forms. Consider the Kyoto 
Protocol. Kyoto 1 seems to have achieved perfect 
compliance levels; indeed, all Annex B countries met or 
even exceeded their emissions reduction or limitation 
targets in the first commitment period.1 Nevertheless, 
when Kyoto 1 expired in 2012 global emissions were 
approximately 50% higher than they were in 1990 
(Kyoto’s baseline year). The reason is that Kyoto 1’s ef-
fectiveness was hampered by at least four forms of 
free riding (Hovi, Skodvin, & Aakre, 2013). First, a few 
countries—most notably the United States—failed to 
ratify. Second, one country—Canada—essentially ig-
nored its emissions reductions commitment until it 
withdrew from the agreement in 2011. Third, some 
economies in transition participated with extremely 
shallow targets that they could easily meet or exceed 
even without implementing any measures specifically 
intended to curb emissions (the hot air problem). Final-
ly, the developing countries ratified without any bind-
ing target for emissions reductions or limitations. 
                                                          
1 http://phys.org/news/2016-06-kyoto-analysis-compliance.html  
We do not dispute that even an agreement that 
falls somewhat short of fulfilling all three requirements 
can make a difference, by causing global emissions to 
become lower than they would have been without the 
agreement. However, no agreement that falls signifi-
cantly short of fulfilling one or more requirements can 
even come close to solving the climate change problem. 
An agreement can be effective in the short and/or 
in the long term. Short-term effectiveness concerns the 
extent to which the agreement is effective in its own 
lifetime (here defined as the first 5-year period). Long-
term effectiveness concerns the extent to which the 
agreement triggers future actions that enhance effec-
tiveness in a longer time perspective (beyond the first 
5-year period).  
The Paris Agreement includes both individual and 
collective goals. Each party reports a nationally deter-
mined contribution (NDC), which constitutes that party’s 
individual goal. Two key collective goals in the Paris 
Agreement are, first, to keep the rise in global mean 
temperatures well below 2 °C and “pursue efforts” to limit 
warming to 1.5 °C and, second, to achieve worldwide car-
bon neutrality sometime between 2050 and 2100.  
An assessment of the agreement’s effectiveness 
thus needs to take into account (1) whether the parties 
comply with their individual goals, and (2) whether the 
aggregate effect of a successful implementation of the 
individual goals enables the parties to reach the 
agreement’s collective goals. In terms of Barrett’s three 
requirements, the latter point concerns whether the 
parties’ (self-determined2) emissions reduction targets 
qualify as deep commitments. If the aggregate effect of 
reaching the individual goals is inadequate to reach the 
collective goals of the agreement, we further need to 
consider whether the agreement includes mechanisms 
that may trigger deeper (more ambitious) commit-
ments over time. The long-term effectiveness of the 
Paris Agreement thus depends on its ability to preserve 
ambitious commitments over time—and further deep-
en them if necessary—while preserving broad partici-
pation and high compliance levels. 
3. Short-Term Effectiveness  
In this section, we consider the short-term effective-
ness of the Paris Agreement. We do so by assessing 
how this Agreement fares regarding participation, the 
depth of participating countries’ commitments, and the 
prospects for achieving high compliance levels. Be-
cause we expect compliance to be the Achilles’ heel of 
the Paris Agreement, we place more emphasis on the 
last requirement than on the first two. 
                                                          
2 In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, where the parties’ individu-
al goals were negotiated (a “top-down approach”), the parties’ 
individual goals in the Paris Agreement are self-determined (a 
“bottom-up” approach). 
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The Kyoto Protocol was ratified by nearly all coun-
tries. However, after the United States denounced the 
agreement, Kyoto imposed an emissions reduction or 
limitation target on only 37 ratifying countries (36 after 
Canada’s withdrawal in 2011). Moreover, these 37 
countries were responsible for less than 20% of global 
emissions. In this sense, participation in Kyoto was ra-
ther limited. 
In contrast, a major strength of the Paris Agree-
ment is its broad participation. In Paris, 195 countries 
consented to the Agreement’s adoption and by 1 
March 2016, 165 countries—including major emitters 
such as China and the United States—had submitted 
their NDCs under the Agreement.3 It is thus fair to say 
that participation is far broader in the Paris Agreement 
than it was in the Kyoto Protocol.  
In Kyoto, Annex I countries committed to reducing 
emissions about 5% below 1990 levels in the first 
commitment period. Many of these countries have 
made considerably deeper commitments under the Paris 
Agreement. For example, the European Union has com-
mitted to reducing emissions 40% below 1990 levels by 
2030. Moreover, the non-Annex I countries have now 
joined the Annex I countries in making commitments.  
Some countries’ NDCs are formulated in a way that 
makes it challenging to determine whether and, if so, 
to what extent their fulfilment requires emissions re-
ductions beyond business as usual. Consequently, it is 
not easy to determine the average depth of the com-
mitments made under the Paris Agreement. However, 
observers seem to think that the current NDCs, if fully 
implemented, will curb global warming to somewhere 
between 2.7 °C and 3.0 °C above preindustrial levels, 
down from the 3.6 °C expected to result with the poli-
cies already in place before (and not including) Paris 
(Kinver, 2015). Thus, a substantial gap remains between 
the Agreement’s collective aims and the sum of the 
parties’ individual NDCs. 
An important question is whether the current NDCs 
will be fully implemented. Under Paris, NDCs are not 
legally binding. Hence, one may well question whether 
it is meaningful to speak of noncompliance if a country 
fails to fulfil its NDC. However, for lack of better terms, 
we will nevertheless use the terms “compliance” and 
“noncompliance”. 
Compliance with an international agreement de-
pends on many factors, of which we will here briefly 
consider three. The first is whether the agreement 
concerned aims to solve a coordination problem or a 
collaboration problem (Stein, 1990). While countries 
participating in an agreement of the former type do 
not face any incentive for noncompliance, countries 
participating in an agreement of the latter type do 
(see, for example, Keohane & Oppenheimer, 2016). 
                                                          
3 NDCs submissions are available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/ 
submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx  
The climate change problem is a collaboration prob-
lem; indeed, it may well be the most challenging col-
laboration problem ever (Barrett, 2003). 
The second factor concerns the depth of the par-
ties’ commitments.4 A shallow commitment does not 
require any costly behavioural change. In contrast, im-
plementing a deep commitment might entail very sub-
stantial costs (Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, 1996). Nearly 
all economic activity entails GHG emissions (Barrett, 
2003). Thus, deep commitments in a climate agreement 
will be very costly to implement. The deeper the com-
mitments, the greater the costs involved, and the great-
er the risk of noncompliance (other things being equal).  
The third factor has to do with the presence or ab-
sence of enforcement measures. In general, the im-
plementation of a climate agreement may be influ-
enced through at least four main types of compliance 
mechanisms: (1) pressure from domestic stakeholders 
(including through domestic courts), (2) informal en-
forcement by other countries, (3) facilitation by inter-
national institutions, and (4) enforcement by interna-
tional institutions.5 While Kyoto relied on all four types, 
it seems that Paris will only rely on the first three. 
The Paris Agreement requires each country to re-
port to other countries— and to the public—its pro-
gress in implementing its NDC. It also includes an ambi-
tion to “track progress towards the long-term goal 
through a robust transparency and accountability sys-
tem”.6 However, Paris provides no material conse-
quences to be implemented against a country that fails 
to fulfil its NDC. Work is currently underway to develop a 
compliance system; however, Paris specifically states 
that any compliance measures should be “expert-based 
and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is 
transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive”. 
It is well known that compliance with international 
environmental agreements is generally good, despite 
that few such agreements include potent enforcement 
measures (Chayes & Chayes, 1995). However, it is far 
from clear that these findings are relevant for deep 
climate agreements, where the costs of compliance are 
                                                          
4 This means that commitment depth influences the Agree-
ment’s effectiveness both directly (a positive effect) and indi-
rectly (via reduced compliance, a negative effect). The net ef-
fect therefore depends on the size of these direct and indirect 
effects.  
5 For example, the 1989 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, which is widely regarded as a very 
successful treaty, includes a possibility of enforcement in the 
form of trade restrictions against nonparticipating and non-
compliant countries (e.g., see Aakre, Helland, & Hovi, 2014). 
While these enforcement measures have never been used, an-
ecdotal evidence suggests that their existence have been im-
portant for boosting participation as well as compliance (Brack, 
2003, p. 220).  
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotia 
tions/paris/index_en.htm  
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likely to be much larger than in other international en-
vironmental agreements.  
Because NDCs are not legally binding, enforcement 
through domestic legal action is also unlikely. Moreover, 
judged by Canada’s experience after its withdrawal from 
Kyoto, we should not expect much informal enforce-
ment by other members if a country fails to deliver on its 
NDC or even withdraws from the Paris agreement.  
Thus, what remains is the possibility of naming and 
shaming by domestic and international politicians and 
pressure groups. The risk of such naming and shaming 
did not deter the United States from denouncing the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2001. Nor did it deter Canada from 
withdrawing 10 years later. It therefore seems perti-
nent to question whether the anticipation of informal 
enforcement will suffice to induce all (or even most) of 
the 195 parties to the Paris Agreement to implement 
their NDCs. Technically, failure to do so may not result 
in noncompliance; it may equally well end in the coun-
tries concerned pulling out of the agreement (similar to 
Canada’s withdrawal from Kyoto). 
Proponents of the management school provide a 
forceful argument that the design of international en-
forcement measures is ‘a waste of time’, because 
states are (according to this school) largely motivated 
by international norms rather than by self-interest 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1995).7 They also argue that simply 
doing the best one can to reach compliance is efficient, 
because constantly looking for opportunities to act as a 
free rider would consume considerable resources. 
Concerning climate change, however, the record for 
commitments without international enforcement is not 
impressive. While participants in the 1988 Toronto 
conference collectively aimed to reduce global CO2 
emissions 20% below 1988 levels by 2005, global emis-
sions actually increased more than 30% between 1988 
and 2005. As noted by Barrett (2008, p. 240), the prob-
lem with such global targets is that “everyone is re-
sponsible for meeting them—meaning, of course, that 
no one is responsible for meeting them”. Barrett’s 
words also apply to the Paris Agreement’s collective 
goal of stabilizing the global mean temperature at no 
more than 2 °C above preindustrial levels, while pursu-
ing efforts to limit warming to 1.5 °C. Indeed, the Paris 
Agreement’s collective goal also suffers from the prob-
lem that the global mean temperature partly depends 
on natural variations; hence, it is even less under the 
control of the parties than global emissions are. 
A better strategy might be to aim for individual tar-
gets, and the Paris Agreement specifies individual tar-
gets in the form of NDCs. However, the record concern-
ing compliance with individual non-binding emissions 
                                                          
7 Following Elster (1989, pp. 98-99), we define a norm as an 
imperative that is not outcome-oriented. A norm is social if it is 
shared by several actors and partly sustained by other actors’ 
approval or disapproval. 
reduction targets is not good either. After the Toronto 
conference, Austria, Denmark, Italy, and Luxembourg 
stated that they would meet the Toronto target individ-
ually by reducing their own emissions 20% below 1988 
levels by 2005. None of them did. Other individual tar-
gets have also been missed (Barrett, 2008).8 Although 
much has changed since the 1980s, it is far from clear 
that we can take it for granted that all countries will fulfil 
their NDCs under the Paris Agreement. 
Assuming that enforcement matters, the countries 
most likely to comply with Paris are the EU members. 
The reason is that the EU controls a number of en-
forcement measures of its own that might be used to 
spur its members to fulfil their targets. 
A way to circumvent the need for enforcement 
could be to design a climate agreement in such a way 
as to transform the climate change collaboration prob-
lem into a coordination problem. Some agreements 
that introduce a technology standard in the presence 
of network externalities might serve as an example 
(see Barrett, 2003). However, the Paris agreement 
makes little (if any) attempt at pursuing this strategy.  
In summary, the Paris Agreement scores high on 
participation and scores reasonably high on depth (alt-
hough assessing such depth is challenging). Thus, con-
cerning short-term effectiveness, the main issue is to 
what extent the countries participating in Paris will ac-
tually fulfil their NDCs. Whereas some countries (such 
as the EU countries) may be expected to be compliant, 
it remains an open question whether a number of oth-
er countries will be. However, even with some non-
compliance, Paris could end up as a reasonably suc-
cessful agreement. Lack of enforcement measures may 
induce some countries to submit deeper NDCs than 
they would have done otherwise (Victor, 2011). The 
irony is that the deeper the commitments, the larger 
the need for enforcement and the less likely that such 
enforcement will be politically feasible (Aakre & Hovi, 
2010). However, at least in principle, an agreement 
with deep commitments and only moderate compli-
ance levels might fare better than one with only shal-
low commitments but full compliance.  
4. Long-Term Effectiveness  
The long-term effectiveness of the Paris agreement 
depends on (1) whether a successful implementation 
of the parties’ individual goals (the NDCs) enables the 
parties to reach their long-term goals of the agree-
ment, and (2) whether the agreement includes mecha-
nisms to further deepen commitments over time, while 
also ensuring high compliance rates and (continued) 
broad participation. 
                                                          
8 For a complete list of declared targets or commitments un-
dertaken by OECD countries at this time, see Paterson and 
Grubb (1992, p. 301). 
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In its adoption of the Paris Agreement, COP21 em-
phasized its “serious concern” for the “urgent need to 
address the significant gap between the aggregate ef-
fect of Parties’ mitigation pledges…and aggregate 
emission pathways consistent with holding the in-
crease in the global average temperature to well below 
2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels” (Decision 1/CP.21, preamble). In the 
short term, the Paris Agreement does little to close this 
gap. A key question, therefore, is whether the Paris 
Agreement includes mechanisms that contribute to 
closing the gap over time.  
The main mechanism to ensure the Agreement’s 
long-term effectiveness is detailed in Article 4, which 
states that each party “shall prepare, communicate and 
maintain successive nationally determined contribu-
tions [NDCs] that it intends to achieve” (Article 4.2). 
These successive NDCs “will represent a progression 
beyond the Party’s then current [NDCs] and reflect its 
highest possible ambition” (Article 4.3, emphasis add-
ed). Each party is invited to communicate its NDC, at 
the latest, when it submits its instrument of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, approval or accession. Parties are 
then requested to communicate a new NDC by 2020 
and every five years thereafter (Article 4.9; Decision 
1/CP.21, paragraphs 21-24).  
This mechanism is supported by the Agreement’s 
reporting, transparency, and monitoring provisions. 
First, a party is obliged to “regularly provide a national 
GHG inventory and the information necessary to track 
progress in implementing and achieving its NDC” (Bo-
dansky & O’Connor, 2016, p. 10), (Article 13.7a, b). 
Second, parties are required to submit their NDCs to 
the secretariat at least 9–12 months in advance of the 
relevant COP/MOP meeting “with a view to facilitate 
the clarity, transparency and understanding of these 
contributions”. The NDCs are then summarized in a 
synthesis report prepared by the secretariat (Decision 
1/CP.21, paragraph 25; Article 4.9). Third, a monitoring 
function of sorts is established in the inclusion of provi-
sions for a “global stocktake”, which implies that the 
COP “shall periodically take stock of the implementa-
tion of this Agreement to assess the collective progress 
towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and 
its long-term goals” (Article 14.1). Such global stocktak-
ing shall take place every five years beginning in 2023 
(i.e., two years before the parties’ NDCs are up for their 
first revision). 
So the Agreement does indeed include mechanisms 
intended to enhance its long-term effectiveness. How-
ever, it remains uncertain whether these mechanisms 
suffice to ensure the positive snowball effect (or race 
to the top) many participants and observers hope for. 
This uncertainty is due to two key features of the 
Agreement. 
First, while the Agreement establishes procedural 
obligations such as the ones mentioned above, it is 
largely silent regarding the substantive content of the 
parties’ NDCs. For instance, the Agreement includes a 
general aim “to reach global peaking of [GHGs] as soon 
as possible” with “rapid reductions thereafter” (Article 
4.1), instructs parties that their NDCs will reflect their 
“highest possible ambition” (Article 4.3), and states 
that developed country parties “should continue taking 
the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emis-
sion reduction targets” (Article 4.4). However, the par-
ties’ commitments will continue to be self-determined 
and may thus, in aggregate, fall well short of reaching 
the collective 2 °C long-term goal. If so, the Paris 
Agreement may, even with full compliance and even in 
the long term, prove unable to close the gap COP21 
expressed its concern about.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Agree-
ment’s lack of an enforcement mechanism might gen-
erate uncertainty concerning some parties’ willingness 
to honour their commitments. A “compliance mecha-
nism” is established to “facilitate implementation and 
promote compliance with the provisions of this 
Agreement” (Article 15.1). But this mechanism will al-
most certainly include no incentives to actively dis-
courage and sanction noncompliance. On the contrary, 
the Paris Agreement expressly states that the compli-
ance mechanism “shall be…non-adversarial and non-
punitive” (Article 15.2). Thus, parties might be tempted 
to communicate over-ambitious NDCs—for instance, 
targets they do not know if they are able to implement, 
are unlikely to implement, or even do not intend to 
implement—with impunity. An NDC thus represents lit-
tle more than a party’s good intentions. If there are 
reasons to doubt a party’s sincerity, other parties’ will-
ingness to implement ambitious emissions reductions 
might be weakened accordingly. The lack of an en-
forcement mechanism, therefore, could limit the 
Agreement’s long-term effectiveness, because it means 
that even if all parties intend to implement ambitious 
emissions reductions, they might nevertheless be re-
luctant to do so simply because they lack confidence in 
other parties’ willingness to honour their commit-
ments. Thus, even if we might see an initial upward cy-
cle of progressively rigorous NDCs, the long-term effec-
tiveness of the Agreement could be modest. 
The lack of an enforcement mechanism is arguably 
the Agreement’s main weakness. Yet, this feature 
might also be the cause of the Agreement’s most 
hailed achievement: participation by a broad scope of 
countries (including developed countries as well as de-
veloping countries and countries with emerging econ-
omies) that have set specified emissions reduction or 
control targets. Indeed, parties may have agreed to 
join the Agreement with emissions control targets pre-
cisely because there is no risk associated with such be-
haviour. While noncompliance might entail reputation-
al damage, it will not entail immediate material costs.  
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The interlinkage between participation, the depth 
of commitments, and enforcement implies that even if 
parties were to supplement the Paris Agreement with 
an enforcement mechanism in the future (there are no 
indications at present that they will), that might ad-
versely affect the incentive to remain a party and/or 
the incentive to submit an ambitious NDC. First, with 
an enforcement mechanism in place, parties that fail to 
implement their NDCs might withdraw from the 
Agreement rather than remain a party and suffer the 
costs of punitive sanctions for noncompliance. Article 28 
states that “at any time after three years from the date 
on which this Agreement has entered into force for a 
Party, that Party may withdraw from the Agreement” 
(28.1), and that “any such withdrawal shall take effect 
upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the 
Depositary of the notification of withdrawal” (28.2).  
Second, with an enforcement mechanism in place, 
parties might feel inclined to submit less ambitious 
NDCs, both to be certain of their ability to meet the 
targets (and hence avoid punitive sanctions) and to en-
able them subsequently to submit progressively more 
rigorous NDCs at low cost. In these scenarios, there-
fore, rather than seeing the positive snowball effect 
everyone hopes for, we might see that the Agreement 
will have decreasing participation and an increasing 
gap between the aggregate effect of parties’ mitigation 
pledges and the required aggregate emission pathway 
to reach the 2 °C goal.  
While the Paris Agreement includes provisions in-
tended to increase its effectiveness over time, no in-
centives are included to support these provisions and 
to ensure their intended effect. The long-term effec-
tiveness of the Paris Agreement thus entirely depends 
on other factors.  
One such factor might be the reputational damage 
that could be associated with nonparticipation and 
noncompliance. Bodansky and O’Connor suggest that 
“states risk greater costs to their reputation and to 
their relations with other states if they violate a treaty 
commitment than a political commitment, making non-
compliance less attractive” (2016, p. 16). But he also 
suggests that ‘the inclusion of transparency and ac-
countability mechanisms in the Paris agreement could 
accomplish the same result. By making it more likely 
that poor performance will be detected and criticized, 
these mechanisms will raise the reputational costs of 
failing to achieve one’s NDC’ (2016, pp. 16-17). Yet, as 
we have already seen, the risk of reputational costs 
does not seem to have significantly influenced the 
United States’ decision not to ratify Kyoto 1, Canada’s 
decision to withdraw from it, or the decision of coun-
tries such as Belarus, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and 
Ukraine not to sign on to Kyoto 2. 
Another factor concerns the market responses to 
the Agreement. If the Paris Agreement generates new 
investment patterns in key global markets, for instance 
by accelerating investments in “green energy” and de-
celerating investments in fossil energy, it could have 
significant implications for future emissions reductions. 
While experts see it as “likely” that the Paris Agree-
ment “will accelerate investments in technologies like 
renewable energy and electric vehicles”, the Interna-
tional Energy Agency forecasts that “fossil fuels will still 
account for about 75 percent of energy demand in 
2030, with coal hitting a plateau, oil growing slightly 
and gas surging” (Campbell, 2015).  
Finally, as noted, the long-term effectiveness of the 
Paris Agreement mostly depends on the extent to 
which parties trust each other to implement their 
commitments. In particular, the Paris Agreement’s 
long-term effectiveness will likely be significantly influ-
enced by the response of large global emitters. In the 
next section, we consider the likelihood that the United 
States will act as a leader under the Paris Agreement.  
5. The United States—A Pivotal Actor in the Paris 
Agreement 
The United States is a crucial player in the Paris Agree-
ment, not only because it is the world’s second largest 
emitter of GHGs but also because it has a special role 
to play in terms of triggering action from other coun-
tries. As described above, the Agreement relies inher-
ently on vagueness in its specification of commitments, 
compliance requirements and the ratcheting-up mech-
anism (see also Keohane & Oppenheimer, 2016). While 
such vagueness was necessary diplomacy for forging 
the Agreement itself and attract broad participation, it 
locks success to reliance on key countries to go first 
and set the stage for a snowball effect (or race to the 
top). As argued by Underdal (1994, pp. 179-180), “the 
more complex the negotiation setting (that is, the larg-
er the number of actors and the number and ‘intricacy’ 
of issues), the more likely that some actors will emerge 
as leaders and others as followers…, and the more crit-
ical leadership becomes as a determinant of success”. 
Arguably, the United States must play an important 
role in such leadership for at least two reasons. First, as 
the largest economy in the world and the second larg-
est carbon emitter the United States is often pointed to 
as a key actor because of its major historical responsi-
bilities for the climate change problem (e.g. World Re-
sources Institute, 2016). What happens with U.S. cli-
mate policy has an effect for the entire world. Second, in 
the history of international climate negotiations the 
United States has often played the role as crucial lag-
gard, blaming lack of participation by all major emitters 
and flawed treaty design for its own non-participation—
for instance in the Kyoto Protocol. Experience thus in-
dicates that for any comprehensive international cli-
mate agreement to work, it is vital that the world’s 
most powerful country shows interest in participation 
and compliance with its pledges. If a pivotal actor like 
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the United States should fail to implement its commit-
ments, it will likely negatively affect other parties’ in-
centives to adopt and implement ambitious NDCs. 
In the following pages, we analyse the role that the 
United States took at COP 21 and in the months pre-
ceding the conference to secure the adoption of a bot-
tom-up agreement. We argue that the United States 
took several crucial steps to influence the outcome. 
We also analyse the domestic politics underlying the 
U.S. position at COP 21, to enable an evaluation of the 
prospects for the country to deliver on its Paris pledg-
es. The dynamic between domestic politics and inter-
national negotiation positions is important in order to 
understand the scope for acceptance of international 
commitments in all countries. In the U.S. case this dy-
namic is influenced by the separation of powers in the 
political system that gives the president great free-
doms in international negotiations, but allows the Sen-
ate decisive powers in issues of treaty ratification and 
funding of new policy programs. Hence, the interaction 
between the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment defines the scope for U.S. pledges at Paris, as 
well as the prospects to fulfil them. It helps explain why 
the United States can come to play an important role 
for the success of the Paris Agreement if it engages in a 
role as first mover (in a race to the top), but can also 
explain why in a difficult collaboration problem like 
climate change the United States may have difficulties 
in taking on such leadership.  
In Paris, U.S. diplomacy and personal engagement 
by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John 
Kerry helped craft compromises that were necessary 
for the adoption of the Agreement. Importantly, 
Obama engaged with China’s President Xi through cru-
cial bilateral contact in the months before the Paris 
meeting, paving the way for support of the Agreement 
by both countries (Goldenberg, 2014; Henderson, 
2015). At the Paris meeting, President Obama said: 
“I’ve come here personally, as the leader of the world’s 
largest economy and the second-largest emitter, to say 
that the United States of America not only recognizes 
our role in creating this problem, we embrace our re-
sponsibility to do something about it” (White House, 
2015). The Obama administration acknowledged that 
the United States can play a key role in inspiring and 
convincing other countries to address their GHG emis-
sions, and committed to reducing U.S. GHG emissions 
26 to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025, premised on 
numerous domestic policy measures that have been or 
are to be implemented (Bang & Schreurs, 2016). Ambi-
tious domestic investments in clean energy, energy ef-
ficiency programs, and new federal regulations limiting 
carbon emissions from power plants are among the 
climate policies initiated by the Obama administration.  
The Obama administration has fought hard for 
changes in domestic climate policy. At the outset of his 
first term, President Obama pushed for the U.S. Con-
gress to pass climate legislation. Several bills were de-
bated, and in June 2009 Congressmen Waxman and 
Markey’s American Clean Energy and Security Act nar-
rowly passed a vote in the House yet later died in the 
Senate (Bang & Skodvin, 2014). Voting on this contro-
versial bill largely followed party lines, reflecting deep 
and bitter polarization between Republicans and Dem-
ocrats (Skocpol, 2013). No climate bill has been debat-
ed in the U.S. Congress since, and with Republican ma-
jorities in both the House and the Senate after the 
2012 elections, climate legislation was no longer on the 
congressional agenda. In his second term, therefore, 
President Obama decided to use executive powers to 
circumvent the congressional gridlock on climate poli-
cy. Acting on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling from 
2009, which identified carbon emissions as a pollutant 
causing risks to the health and welfare of citizens, 
Obama ordered the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to develop regulations under the Clean Air Act to 
cut CO2 emissions in the power sector by 32% by 2030 
(Bang, 2015). The EPA worked with stakeholders and 
state-level regulators over two years (2013–2015) to 
set up regulations—the Clean Power Plan—that en-
gage states to design individual plans for cutting car-
bon emissions from power plants. States are assigned 
individual emissions reduction targets, and are encour-
aged to find policy solutions adapted to local circum-
stances to minimize negative effects on industry and 
consumers (EPA, 2015).  
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) is extremely controver-
sial among policymakers at both the federal and the 
state levels. The controversy centres on whether the 
Clean Air Act gives the president and the EPA the au-
thority to introduce wide-ranging regulations for CO2 
emissions without involving the U.S. Congress. Oppo-
nents at the federal and state levels have sought to put 
up barriers. Republican leaders in Congress have 
vowed to cancel the CPP at the first opportunity. Sen-
ate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (Republican from 
Kentucky) encouraged states not to start developing 
plans, arguing that they would be wasting resources 
since the CPP will likely be removed either through 
congressional action by the Republican majority or 
through the courts (Cama, 2016). Several votes in Con-
gress in 2013–2015 tried to remove the EPA’s authority 
on the issue; however, those bills that passed were ve-
toed by the president. In October 2015, a coalition of 
26 states—many of which depend heavily on coal for 
power generation—brought litigation against the EPA, 
arguing that the CPP represented a “power grab” by 
the federal government over state-level electricity sys-
tems that would be excessively burdensome for the 
states’ economies (Bang & Schreurs, 2016). A signifi-
cant blow to the Obama administration’s climate policy 
came in February 2016 when a 5-4 decision in the Su-
preme Court stayed implementation of the CPP until 
judicial review of its legality. The Court’s decision illus-
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trates the fragility of the Obama administration’s cli-
mate policy and the significant role of judicial review 
when executive power is used to impose policy in a 
controversial field. If the Supreme Court decides to 
hear the case, its ruling might influence the future of 
the CPP as well as the U.S. ability to fulfil its commit-
ment in the Paris Agreement.  
Many U.S. states have put on hold any effort to de-
velop state implementation plans for adhering to the 
CPP, while other states are pursuing climate action re-
gardless of the uncertainty surrounding the plan’s fu-
ture (C2ES, 2016). Clearly, deep polarization in U.S. cli-
mate policy affects the United States’ ability to live up 
to the promises it made in Paris. Without a firm do-
mestic policy strategy, like the CPP or some other fed-
eral climate policy, investors and business owners will 
have weak incentives to make long-term business deci-
sions that include a pathway to a low carbon economy. 
Moreover, the U.S. NDC under the Paris Agreement will 
be less credible. U.S. political parties greatly disagree 
on the importance of climate policy action. Most Dem-
ocrats accept that climate change is a serious problem 
that requires political action to reduce emissions. Most 
Republicans, on the other hand, are not committed to 
addressing the climate change problem, because they 
do not believe in the science or because they think it is 
premature to risk the potential economic hardship that 
climate action might bring (Leiserowitz et al., 2016).  
These different views regarding the need for cli-
mate policy action convey the level of willingness to 
recognize the Paris Agreement as a priority for the 
United States. While President Obama and a clear ma-
jority in the Democratic Party are fully committed, Re-
publican leaders reacted very differently to the Agree-
ment’s adoption. The immediate reaction of leading 
Republicans after COP 21 indicated a looming fight 
over the commitment to the Paris Agreement. Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “Obama is mak-
ing promises he can't keep” and should remember that 
the Agreement “is subject to being shredded” after the 
2016 election. With reference to the presidential elec-
tion, McConnell said the Agreement could be reversed 
if the Republicans win the White House (Freking, 2015). 
Republicans argued that the deal is simply politically 
binding, not judicially binding, and hence barely worth 
any serious attention. Congressman Ed Whitfield (Re-
publican from Kentucky) described the Paris Agree-
ment as merely a “signal” of the Obama administra-
tion’s preferences rather than a treaty. He said, “While 
some may claim the resulting deal is a grand triumph, 
the bottom line is that this was a nonbinding political 
document that does not impose any new obligation on 
the United States”. He added that Obama “misled the 
international community in Paris” (Chemnik, 2016).  
The Republican Party Convention in 2016 adopted a 
political platform that explicitly rejects any form of 
federal carbon price, and pledged to disengage the 
United States from any further involvement with the 
“non-binding” Paris Agreement. The Democratic Party 
Convention in 2016 supported both a carbon tax, con-
tinuation of Obama’s climate policy programs, and ful-
filment of pledges made in Paris. Presidential candi-
dates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton mirror their 
party’s opposing views, hence representing starkly dif-
ferent ways forward for U.S. climate policy. 
In sum, deep political polarization over climate 
change prevents the United States from sending a clear 
signal to other countries that it is ready to address car-
bon emissions seriously and to lead the international 
process envisioned by the Paris Agreement. Potentially, 
the 2016 presidential election could upset Obama’s 
climate leadership and put the United States back in a 
position where no credible federal climate policy initia-
tives exist. For the time being, therefore, the potential 
and willingness for the United States to lead is unclear. 
6. Conclusion 
To build an effective climate agreement and to 
strengthen it over time, states might rely on two main 
types of factors—norms and incentives. An ideal 
agreement would ensure that both norms and incen-
tives push the parties to make serious efforts to reduce 
emissions and to gradually reinforce those efforts. 
The Paris Agreement currently relies disproportion-
ately on norms, while doing little to restructure states’ 
incentives so as to deter free riding. Norms and incen-
tives thus pull in opposite directions, meaning that the 
outcome will depend on the force of each factor. Be-
cause virtually all economic activity entails emissions of 
GHGs, the incentive to free ride is much stronger in the 
context of climate change than in the context of other 
international environmental cooperation. Unsurprising-
ly, therefore, the historical record of climate change 
cooperation suggests that the force of incentives has 
thus far outweighed that of norms. Judged by this rec-
ord, the Paris Agreement may well suffer a fate similar 
to Kyoto’s. Kyoto, too, aimed for a series of 5-year pe-
riods with new and more ambitious commitments in 
every period. Yet already by the end of the first period, 
this architecture was clearly not viable. 
On a more optimistic note, norms can change. For 
example, the Paris Agreement shows that today’s in-
terpretation of the common-but-differentiated-
responsibilities norm differs from that of the 1990s 
and 2000s. Consequently, the cards are now stacked 
somewhat less in favour of incentives than they were 
then. Domestic and international norms may well con-
tinue to develop such that it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult for individuals, firms, and states to ignore pleas to 
limit and reduce their carbon footprints. In addition, 
technological progress may gradually lessen abatement 
costs. Such developments would further favour norms 
over incentives. Finally, if major emitters such as the 
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United States prove able and willing to take the lead, it 
might further strengthen cooperative norms and limit 
other countries’ costs of compliance. Such develop-
ments might ultimately pave the way for a transfor-
mation from a logic of consequences to a logic of appro-
priateness in the field of climate change (Mitchell, 2015). 
So far, however, deep political polarization has rep-
resented a significant barrier to U.S. leadership on cli-
mate change. Thus, while the Paris Agreement could 
become the start of a race to the top that sets the 
world on a path towards solving the climate change 
problem, it might also end as a flop, much like the Kyo-
to Protocol did. The latter outcome is particularly plau-
sible if the United States and other major emitters 
prove unable or unwilling to lead.  
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